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INTRODUCTION
“In our society, liberty is the norm and detention prior to trial
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”1
While the Supreme Court has emphasized the exceptional
nature of infringements on any individual’s liberty, the reality of
our criminal justice system contradicts this sentiment.
Marginalized people,2 whether because of race or socioeconomic
status, disproportionately find themselves as the exception to
this rule—the exception to laws that are intended to protect all
Americans equally.3 Where liberty is the norm, it is not the norm
for people of color.4 Where pretrial detention is the carefully
limited exception, it is not the carefully limited exception for
people of color.5 Where the presumption of innocence is a tenet to
be fiercely protected, it is not fiercely protected for people of
color.6
 J.D. Candidate, Expected May 2021, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School
of Law. To my Dad, Mom, and Ramy: no words can adequately express how grateful I am
for you. You have always pushed me to pursue my dreams and encouraged me every step
of the way. A special thank you to the Honorable Serena Murillo for her invaluable
guidance, instruction, and support. To Jenny Carey, Professor of Law at Chapman
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this challenging topic, and your faith in me was a driving force in this process. Finally,
thank you to all the policy makers, legislators, and activists who work tirelessly to
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1 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
2 Throughout this Article, marginalization refers to racial identification and
socioeconomic status—often times race and socioeconomic status interplay. This Article is
not generalizing that all people of color are of low socioeconomic status or that all people
of low socioeconomic status are people of color. However, U.S. history and the laws set in
place because of that history make it difficult to address one without the other.
3 See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), 132 HARV. L. REV. 2098, 2107 (2019).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 These sentiments describe overall trends in the criminal justice system, with the
understanding that there will always be outliers. See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2018), supra note 3 at 2098; see also Bryce Covert, A Bail Reform Tool Intended to
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In United States v. Salerno, quoted above, the Supreme Court
held that in certain situations, the Government’s regulatory
interest in community safety outweighs an individual’s interest in
liberty.7 For this reason, the Court found the Bail Reform Act of
19848 facially valid and not a violation of a defendant’s
constitutional rights.9 It did not infringe upon the carefully limited
exception the Court delineated in Salerno.10 But while this Act and
others like it are not facially invalid and are—in theory—designed
to protect all people equally, in practice these laws do not perform
as they are intended.11 As for the reality of the cash bail system,
indigent individuals’ liberties are not protected at all costs and
detention is not the carefully limited exception. In fact, the
opposite is true: detention is the norm, and liberty is the carefully
limited exception.
In an effort to remedy this harsh reality and even the
playing field regarding enforcement of these laws, bail reform
has increasingly shifted toward pretrial risk assessments—the
tool designed to “replace judicial instincts with validated
algorithms and . . . reserve detention for high-risk defendants.”12
Modern criminal justice reform literature discusses at length the
propriety and impropriety of risk assessments, but there is a gap
in the literature as to a solution that combines the ideas and
concerns of both critics and advocates.13
Part I of this Article surveys the history of bail, which dates
back to Anglo-Saxon England with the use of “bots” to pay
Curb Mass Incarceration has only Replicated Biases in the Criminal Justice System,
INTERCEPT (July 12, 2020, 5:00 AM), http://theintercept.com/2020/07/12/risk-assessmenttools-bail-reform/ [http://perma.cc/RQ4Q-52VE].
7 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 (1987).
8 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 mandated “‘pretrial release of the person on personal
recognizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by
the court . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure
the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community.’ The Act further provides that if, after a hearing, ‘the judicial officer finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person (as
required) and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall
order the detention of the person before trial.’” The Act creates a rebuttable presumption
toward confinement when the person has committed certain delineated offenses, such as
crimes of violence or serious drug crimes. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE
INSTITUTE, THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 17–18 (Sept. 24, 2010),
http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/2b990da76de40361b6_rzm6ii4zp.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3B2-7AKJ].
9 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
10 Id.
11 See S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), supra note 3 at 2098; see also
Covert, supra note 6.
12 Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal
Sentencing, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2018).
13 Critics of risk assessments propose complete abandonment of the tool, while
advocates support its use. The literature is underdeveloped with solutions that
meaningfully combine the efforts and concerns of both sides.
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reparations to victims.14 With the Norman Conquest of England,
the system shifted its focus away from victims toward pretrial
detention and punishment for the offender.15 To prevent the
unchecked discretion sheriffs and judges exercised over pretrial
decisions, the British wrote a prohibition against excessive bail
into the English Bill of Rights.16 Colonial American States then
penned this same language into their state constitutions.17
However, with the emergence of bail bondsmen, bail in the U.S.
morphed into an industry that functions more as a corporate
machine than a public service.18
Part II of this Article addresses the problems caused by cash
bail, including the large number of individuals—more than 550,000
at last count—in jail awaiting trial or sentencing, notwithstanding
the presumption of ‘innocent until proven guilty’.19 Many defendants
who cannot post bond face only minor charges and spend more time
behind bars during the pretrial phase, where they “enjoy” the
presumption of innocence, than they ever would if convicted.20
Part III discusses modern efforts at bail reform, specifically
SB 10—California’s recent proposal. SB 10 was a product of the
Chief Justice of California’s charge for reevaluation of
California’s current bail system.21 Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
tasked a working group of diverse judges with researching and
reporting on the current cash bail system.22 This bill acts as a
model of how risk assessments can be used to release all low-risk
offenders who do not present a threat to public safety and detain
high risk offenders who do. Risk assessments are a tool used to
enhance judicial discretion, not replace it.23
Due to the difficulty in implementing reform that resolves
problems and the lack of a workable solution, Part IV of this Article
evaluates the two main schools of thought on bail reform: advocates
and critics of risk assessments. Those who advocate for risk
assessments urge it is prudent to replace human subjectivity with a
See infra Part I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html
[http://perma.cc/EZ6G-U6KU].
20 Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail
Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 935–36 (2013).
21 Bail Reform Act of 2018, S.B. 10, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in
Chapter 244 on August 28, 2018); State of the Judiciary March 2016, CAL. COURTS (Mar. 8,
2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.courts.ca.gov/34477.htm [http://perma.cc/BDE4-6LN6].
22 State of the Judiciary March 2016, supra note 21.
23 Id.
14
15
16
17
18
19
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consistent algorithm,24 while those who criticize these assessments
argue that by using racially entrenched data, risk assessments
further perpetuate racially discriminatory practices.25 Champions of
risk assessments have valid concerns about the efficacy and
constitutionality of the cash bail system, while critics of risk
assessments have valid concerns about the efficacy and
constitutionality of these proposed algorithms.
Often with reform, the lack of a perfect solution inhibits
change. Part V of this Article proposes a comprehensive solution by
taking the best arguments from both sides of the risk assessment
aisle and compiles them into a three-fold working solution that
recognizes the value of risk assessments while discouraging its
potential for discriminatory effects.26 This three-part solution is to
be implemented as one cohesive operation—each component
depends on the other functioning properly.
First, risk assessments should be used diagnostically prior to
arraignment to direct a defendant’s next step in the pretrial
release process, ultimately releasing defendants charged with
misdemeanors assessed as “low risk” within a matter of hours
after their arrest. Second, the agency that administers the risk
assessments should be a Pretrial Assessment Services Agency
that is a separate, independent branch under the umbrella of the
court, not the probation department. Finally, to encourage risk
assessments as an enhancement rather than a replacement to
judicial discretion, judges must be trained on how to recognize
bias both in the courtroom and in the data.27 Judges should be
required to make tentative rulings on the record given all the
information about a defendant on paper, before ever confronting
the defendant. A judge wishing to change the tentative ruling
must state her reasons for doing so on the record at the bail
hearing. Additionally, there must be an effort to diversify the
bench itself. If judges are to retain their discretion, it is
imperative they recognize how their decisions may be disparately
impacting people of color and perpetuating marginalization.

24 See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV.
303, 317 (2018).
25 Vienna Thompkins, What Are Risk Assessments—and How Do They Advance
Criminal Justice Reform?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 23, 2018),
http://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/what-are-risk-assessments-andhow-do-they-advance-criminal-justice-reform [http://perma.cc/GYY2-PYDF].
26 See infra Part V.
27 Biased data refers to data that may not be probative of a person’s flight risk,
either because they are part of a demographic more likely to be accused of crimes, and in
turn more likely to be arrested, and thus, more likely to receive an inflated assessment of
risk.
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I. HISTORY OF BAIL
“Bail emerged to solve a problem we still grapple with
today—balancing the general right of defendants to pre-trial
freedom with the need of society to protect against flight and
ensure punishment.”28 The concept of bail has its origins in
Anglo-Saxon England. Criminal wrongs were settled through
“bots,” which were amends or reparations paid to the victim or
person wronged.29 Crimes were private affairs and were not
prosecuted in the name of the state as they are today.30 Wrongs
were righted with money, not imprisonment.31 However, in a
select number of cases, persons considered dangerous or a threat
to the public were mutilated or executed.32
Anglo-Saxons had two primary motivations: securing public
safety and ensuring the accused did not escape the consequences
of their actions.33 “Thus, a system was created in which the
defendant was required to find a surety who would provide a
pledge to guarantee both the appearance of the accused in court
and payment of the bot upon conviction.”34 That pledge was
quantified to equal the amount of the penalty.35 This was called
“bail.”36
This bail system ensured that if the “accused were to flee,
the responsible surety would pay the entire amount to the
private accuser, and the matter was done.”37
Since the amount of the pledge and the possible penalty were
identical, the effect of a successful escape would have been a default
judgment for the amount of the bot. To the extent the accused left
behind sufficient property to pay the bot, he would have had no
incentive for flight. To the extent the surety bore the financial
responsibility for the payment, he had every incentive to ensure the
appearance of the accused.38

Perhaps “[t]he Anglo-Saxon bail process was . . . the last entirely
rational application of bail.”39

28 JOHN-MICHAEL SEIBLER & JASON SNEAD, THE HISTORY OF CASH BAIL, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION 6, 8 (2017).
29 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 1.
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 1–2.
33 See id. at 2.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic
Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520 (1983).
39 Id.
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Beginning in 1066 with the Norman Conquest of England,
the bail system shifted away from reparations and toward
confinement and corporal punishment.40 Executions and
mutilations were phased out, but corporal punishment
escalated.41 The possibility of corporal punishment heightened
the criminal’s desire to flee.42 With the formation of juries,43
wrongs became less of a private affair and more of a criminal
process that involved more than just the oppressed and their
oppressor.44 Criminals were held in confinement by the shire’s
reeve, equivalent to a county sheriff, and magistrates travelled
from shire to shire making determinations about who would be
confined and who would be released.45 Sheriffs were unchecked in
their pretrial detention decisions and judges unchecked in their
bail determinations. 46 Abuse and corruption were rampant.47
In response to this widespread abuse, Parliament passed the
Statute of Westminster, which took a different approach to bail
than the Anglo-Saxons but still rearticulated the underlying
notion “that the bail process must mirror the outcome of the
trial.”48 The Statute established three criteria that governed a
bail decision: (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the probability of
conviction; and (3) the criminal history of the accused.49 “[T]his
standard governed English bail bond determinations for the next
five centuries,” but not without continued abuse.50 Judges set bail
extremely high to place additional obstacles in the way of a
defendant’s release.51 This abuse eventually led to the prohibition
against “excessive bail” in the English Bill of Rights of 1689—"a
phrase similar to that found in the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution.”52
In 1791, the Framers translated this principle into the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guaranteed a right to

See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
Id.
Id.
“The exact time of the introduction of the jury trial into England is a question
much discussed by historians, some of them contending it was developed from laws
brought over by William the Conqueror, while others point to . . . its existence . . . among
the Anglo-Saxons prior to the Norman Conquest.” Robert von Moschzisker, Historic
Origin of Trial by Jury, 70 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 1, 2 (1921).
44 See id. at 4.
45 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 3.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 4.
52 Id.
40
41
42
43
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be free of excessive bail, not a right to bail itself.53 But language
from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 guaranteeing a right to bail
itself made its way into most state constitutions by the mid-19th
century. Section 14, Article 2 stated, “All persons shall . . . be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where
proof is evident, or presumption great.”54 State constitutions
interpreted this language as making “risk of flight the only
legitimate factor . . . in denying bail in non-capital cases.”55 Thus,
any sort of “infringement on the presumption of innocence was
justified on the grounds” that the accused was a flight risk.56
The Supreme Court affirmed this practice in Stack v. Boyle.57
The Court proclaimed that “[u]nless this right to bail before trial
is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.”58 In the same vein,
“[s]ince the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any
individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to
the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant” at trial.59
Laws regarding bail seek to accommodate two primary
concerns: the presumption of innocence and the risk of flight. The
former must be protected, and the latter must be protected
against. However, a shift occurred in the 20th century. “As the
nation grew and urbanized,” the bail bond system morphed into a
political and lucrative for-profit industry.60 The U.S. is only one
of two countries that allows for-profit bail bonding (the
Philippines is the other).61 Beginning in the mid-20th century,
independent commercial bail companies and bail bond
53 While some argue that the right to bail is inherent in the Eighth Amendment’s
protection against non-excessive bail, the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that
the Constitution affords a right to bail itself. See Donald P. Lay & Jill De La Hunt, The
Bail Reform Act of 1984: A Discussion, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 929, 945 (1985). In fact,
in United States v. Salerno, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not create a
right to bail. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). See also Thirty-Third Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure, Bail, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 291, 291 (2004).
54 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
Northwest
of
the
River
Ohio,
O UR
D OCUMENTS ,
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/document_data/document_transcripts/document_00
8_transcript.html [http://perma.cc/M5QX-9AVS]; Kurt X. Metzmeier, Preventive
Detention: A Comparison of Bail Refusal Practices in the United States, England,
Canada and Other Common Law Nations, 8 P ACE I NT ’ L L. R EV . 399, 405 (1996).
55 Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 406.
56 See id.
57 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951).
58 Id. at 4.
59 Id. at 5.
60 Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 406.
61 Louis Jacobson, Are U.S., Philippines the Only Two Countries with Money Bail?,
POLITIFACT (Oct. 9, 2018), http://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2018/oct/09/gavinnewsom/are-us-philippines-only-two-countries-money-bail/ [http://perma.cc/T84F-BMJV];
see also PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM:
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 33 (2017).
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associations began to industrialize and institutionalize the bail
system.62 Bail bondsmen, unencumbered by any legal restriction,
“stalked the corridors of city police courts and county houses” to
arbitrarily set bail on a defendant-by-defendant basis.63 In many
states, particularly in the South, this practice detrimentally
affected African Americans because of their lower socio-economic
status, and became just one building block of their systemic
disenfranchisement.64 Having no true understanding of “risk,”
bail bondsman relied on personal judgment and prejudice to
make these determinations.65 “[W]ealthy and politically
connected defendants were released, while the poor” were not.66
Those who fell prey to the commercializing tactics of the industry
often spent as much time in jail awaiting trial as the time they
would likely have served if actually convicted.67
The presumption of innocence that was once so highly valued
increasingly became overshadowed by the corporate machine that is
the American cash bail system. Currently, about seventy-four
percent of American inmates have not been convicted of a crime.68
Many of these detainees present no flight risk or risk to public
safety if released.69 So why are these defendants still locked up? As
has been true for decades, their financial and socioeconomic
conditions do not afford them an ability to pay the money necessary
to post bond.70 “If they could pay their bail or bail bondsman’s fee,
they could walk out the front door and go home.”71
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CASH BAIL SYSTEM
Pretrial detention interrupts a defendant’s life in ways that
have drastic, lasting impacts. For defendants who pose a risk to
the safety of their community, this interruption can be justified.
But for defendants who are shackled to a jail cell because of an
inability to pay, and not because they present a risk to the
community, this interruption cannot be justified. Ability to post

PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61.
Metzmeier, supra note 54, at 407.
Id. at 406–07.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, supra note 19.
69 See PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
supra note 61, at 69.
70 See, e.g., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF ORANGE, 2020 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE
(FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR), at 1 (2020); SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF L.A., 2020 BAIL
SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS, at 1 (2020).
71 Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing,
supra note 12, at 1127.
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
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bond is a socioeconomic issue that directly correlates with race.72
Bail determinations are not color-blind.73 The current cash bail
system uses a defendant’s financial situation, rather than risk of
flight, to determine appropriateness of detention.74
Uprooting a person from their daily routine can destroy their
employment and housing stability, leave children parentless, and
instigate and perpetuate idleness.75 Seventy-five percent of pretrial
detainees have been charged with minor, non-violent crimes such as
drug offenses,76 yet the impact of pretrial detention is anything but
minor. Just as punishment should be proportional to the harm
committed, so should detention prior to trial. But what our current
cash bail system does is anything but proportional.77
Not only does pretrial detention disrupt the flow of a
defendant’s life, but prolonged periods of pretrial detention
actually increase the defendant’s likelihood of committing
another crime.78 Even if a defendant is low-risk, when held two to
three days in detention, that person is almost forty percent more
likely to commit new crimes than a similarly situated defendant
who was held no longer than twenty-four hours.79 As the number
of days in detention increases, so does the likelihood of the
defendant committing a new crime.80
Pretrial detention can also affect the outcome of a
defendant’s case.81 Extended periods of detention effectively force
defendants into pleading guilty at an early stage in the

72 See Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black
Americans in the Criminal Justice System, VERA INST. OF JUST. 8 (May 2018),
http://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf
[http://perma.cc/B7XQ-55AF] (“A 2013 review of 50 years of studies on racial disparities in bail
practices found that black people are subject to pretrial detention more frequently, and have
bail set at higher amounts, than white people who have similar criminal histories and are
facing similar charges. Studies documented this disparity in state and federal cases as well as
juvenile justice proceedings, and in all regions of the country.”).
73 See Jones, supra note 20, at 938–42.
74 See id. at 921.
75 See PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
supra note 61, at 13.
76 Jones, supra note 20, at 935.
77 See, e.g., SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF ORANGE, 2020 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE
(FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR), supra note 70, at 1; SUPERIOR CT. OF CAL. CNTY. OF L.A.,
2020 BAIL SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS, supra note 70, at 1.
78 Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention, LJAF 3
(Nov. 2013), http://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hiddencosts_FNL.pdf [http://perma.cc/J6JV-ZK2U].
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Léon Digard & Elizabeth Swavola, Justice Denied: The Harmful and Lasting Effects of
Pretrial
Detention,
VERA
INST.
OF
JUST.
2–3
(April
2019),
http://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf
[http://perma.cc/D2BF-RC8Y].
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proceedings when they otherwise may not have in order to
“secure their release from custody.”82 Many of these defendants,
especially first-time offenders, will do whatever it takes to get out
of jail while awaiting trial.83
Bail is not only problematic on a micro level, but also on a
macro level, revealing a larger broken criminal justice system. The
multitude of people subject to pretrial confinement exacerbates the
national crisis of jail overcrowding.84 Six out of ten people in jail are
awaiting trial.85 As such, if we wish to remedy the problem of mass
incarceration, reforming the bail system is a necessary predicate.
Our cash bail system is not only disrupting individuals’ personal
lives—it is perpetuating a larger system of injustice.
III. SB 10 AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR BAIL REFORM
As evidenced by its history, the American bail system is
riddled with injustices which persist to this day. Legislators and
community activists continue to seek reform. “In 2016, state
lawmakers in 44 states and the District of Columbia enacted 118
new laws regarding pretrial detention and release.”86 In an effort
to decrease the historical disparities endemic in the pretrial
process, California advanced SB 10, a bill aiming to address bail
reform. This bill would have effectively eliminated cash bail and
relied instead on risk assessments for pretrial determinations.
SB 10 models a bail system that reflects the principle that cash
bail is inherently flawed, that risk assessments are beneficial
when utilized in a limited fashion, and that judges cannot be
completely removed from the process.
A. History of SB 10
During her State of the Judiciary address in 2016, Chief
Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye called for a review of California’s
current cash bail system:87
I think it’s time for us to really ask the question whether or not bail
effectively serves its purpose, or does it in fact penalize the poor.
Bail—does it really ensure public safety? Does it in fact assure

82 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE, supra
note 61, at 14.
83 See id.
84 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 8, at 10.
85 Why
are People
in Jail Before
Trial?, PRETRIAL JUST. INST.,
https://www.pretrial.org/get-involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/
(last visited Nov. 27, 2020) [http://perma.cc/7877-SMEX].
86 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61, at 18.
87 State of the Judiciary March 2016, supra note 21.
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people’s appearance in court, or would a more effective risk
assessment tool be as effective for some cases?88

Motivated by these concerns, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye
established a Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup in October of
2016.89 This Reform Workgroup consisted of a diverse task force90
of nine judges and one court executive officer from across the
state who “studied the bail system, listened to all interested
stakeholders, discussed the issues and unanimously reached
these recommendations in the report.”91 After the task force
spent a year critically studying these issues, “it became clear that
the current system of money bail fails to adequately address
public safety and the profound negative impacts on those
individuals who should not be detained before trial.”92 The
recommendations of this task force eventually became part of SB
10, introduced by Senator Robert Hertzberg on December 05,
2016.93
After several amendments on the floor of the Assembly and
the Senate, SB 10 was signed into law by Governor Brown on
August 28, 2018.94 This law was to take effect on October 01,
2019.95 However, the day after it was signed, Thomas W.
Hiltachk, backed by the Californians Against the Reckless Bail
Scheme, introduced and filed veto referendum 1856 to overturn
this law.96 The bail bond industry was able to garner opposition
Id.
PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 61, at 1.
90 This group is diverse in many senses of the word, including their education,
background, and ethnicity.
91 Merrill Balassone, Jud. Council Pub. Affs., Chief Justice Workgroup: Money Bail is
“Unsafe
and
Unfair,”
CAL.
CTS.
NEWSROOM
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/chief-justice-workgroup-money-bail-is-unsafe-andunfair [http://perma.cc/HS3B-U2B6].
92 Id.
93 The Pretrial Detention Reform Workgroup’s ten recommendations were: (1)
implement a robust risk-based pretrial assessment and supervision system to replace the
current money bail system, (2) expand the use of risk-based preventive detention, (3)
establish pretrial services in every county, (4) use a validated pretrial risk assessment, (5)
make early release and detention decisions, (6) integrate victim rights into the system, (7)
apply pretrial procedures to violations of community supervision, (8) provide adequate
funding and resources, (9) deliver consistent and comprehensive education, and (10) adopt
a new framework of legislation and rules of court to implement these recommendations.
Id.
94 Governor Signs SB 10, Eliminating Money Bail in California, SENATE MAJORITY
LEADER
SENATOR
ROBERT
HERTZBERG
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/8282018-governor-signs-sb-10-eliminating-money-bailcalifornia [http://perma.cc/5V6L-TBJX].
95 See Michael McGough, The Fate of California’s Cash Bail Industry will Now Be
Decided on the 2020 Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 1:04 PM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/article224682595.html [http://perma.cc/5DK4-3VMQ].
96 See
id.; see also California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail
with
Risk
Assessments
Referendum
(2020),
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_25,_Replace_Cash_Bail_with_Risk_Assess
88
89

Do Not Delete

586

5/17/2021 12:41 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

to this bill by labeling its proposed reforms as a system that
would jeopardize the safety of the community and implement a
discriminatory risk assessment system—concerns that are widely
held by critics of risk assessments in general.97 Claiming that SB
10 would single-handedly decimate a $2-billion nationwide
industry by abolishing cash bail in California, the bail industry
did everything it could to halt its implementation.98 For SB 10’s
opponents to successfully take it out of the hands of the
legislature, they needed to collect five percent of the total votes
cast for Governor Brown in the 2014 general election, which
totaled 365,880 signatures.99 The coalition succeeded, gathering
far more signatures than necessary.100 By November 20, 2018,
the coalition had collected more than 575,000 signatures.101 After
the signatures were verified, the Secretary of State certified the
initiative on January 16, 2019.102 In less than three months, SB
10’s opponents had snatched it from the hands of the legislature
that had toiled over it for years, and placed it instead into the
hands of voters for the 2020 general election in the form of
Proposition 25.103
Just as private interest groups were able to fund a veto
referendum to secure Proposition 25 a spot on the November
ballot, they further employed their wealth and influence to
ensure Proposition 25 did not pass, an effort aided by divisions
among pro-reform advocates.104 A “yes” vote on Proposition 25
would have upheld the contested legislation and effectively
abolished cash bail. A “no” vote would repeal the legislation and

ments_Referendum_(2020) [http://perma.cc/27E6-C9DC] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
97 See e.g., California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments
Referendum (2020), supra note 96; BlackLivesMatter–LA (@BLMLA) Twitter, (Aug. 18,
2018,
4:37
PM),
https://twitter.com/blmla/status/1030961861234122752?lang=en
[http://perma.cc/8CSS-78BA].
98 2020
California
Ballot
Propositions,
CAL.
RENTAL
ASS’N
https://www.naylornetwork.com/ria-nwl/articles/indexv3.asp?aid=570461&issueID=65741 [http://perma.cc/NGB2-NW5J] (noting there are over
3,000 registered bail agents in California alone).
99 McGough, supra note 96.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments Referendum
(2020), supra note 96.
103 See id.
104 See Matt Brannon, Props 20 and 25 Failed. What Does That Tell Us About
Criminal Justice Reform in California?, RECORD SEARCHLIGHT (Nov. 5, 2020, 3:36 PM),
https://www.redding.com/story/news/local/2020/11/05/california-prop-20-25-criminaljustice-reform-shasta-county-jail/6180378002/
[http://perma.cc/ZHA5-ST88];
Patrick
McGreevy, Prop. 25, Which Would Have Abolished California’s Cash Bail System, is
Rejected
by
Voters,
L.A.
TIMES
(Nov.
3,
2020,
8:49
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-election-prop-25results [http://perma.cc/Y7TX-J4TP].
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maintain the current cash bail system.105 On November 3rd, 2020,
during one of the most contentious election years, California
voters voted to repeal SB 10.106 Although 43.59% of voters voted
to uphold SB 10, 56.41% voted to strike it down.107
There are two main reasons the proposition did not
pass: opposition by bail coalition groups108 and opposition by
progressive activist groups.109 Unsurprisingly, bail coalitions did not
want their industry and livelihood to collapse. Perhaps more
surprisingly, progressive activist groups were fragmented in their
support of SB 10, with some believing the proposed alternative to
cash bail would actually further racial discrimination within the
criminal justice system.110 Because Proposition 25 failed, California
finds itself back at square one in regard to bail reform. Now, more
than ever, a meaningful solution is required, one that anticipates
the criticisms and opposition the Proposition encountered that
ultimately led to its demise.
B. What the Bill Proposed
SB 10 sought to condition a defendant’s eligibility for release
on their risk rather than their charge.111 The goal was to achieve
a “just and fair pretrial release and detention system [that]
provides due process, recognizes the presumption of innocence,
and advances the government’s fundamental role in protecting
public safety.”112 The current bail system does not treat pretrial
detention as a “carefully limited exception” to the presumption of
innocence across all racial groups alike. SB 10 aimed for counties
to impose the least-restrictive nonmonetary condition (or
combination of conditions) that would have reasonably assured
public safety and the suspect’s return to court.113

105 California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk Assessments Referendum
(2020), supra note 96.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See
2020
California
Ballot
Propositions,
CAL.
RENTAL
ASS’N,
https://www.naylornetwork.com/ria-nwl/articles/index-v3.asp?aid=570461&issueID=65741
[http://perma.cc/GH4R-FXSR] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
109 Marisa Lagos, Proposition 25 Would End Cash Bail. So Why Are Some Progressive
Groups Against It?, KQED (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.kqed.org/news/11841209/proposition25-would-end-cash-bail-so-why-are-some-progressive-groups-against-it
[http://perma.cc/X7RV-32TS] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
110 See Anabel Munoz, California Prop. 25 Explained: Voters to Decide Whether to
End State’s Cash-Bail System, ABC (Oct. 30, 2020), https://abc7.com/prop-25-cash-bailproposition-california/7482465/ [http://perma.cc/M4UY-8CYG] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
111 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on
August 28, 2018).
112 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 52.
113 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on
August 28, 2018).
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The law contemplates bail through four pretrial stages: (1)
book and release, (2) pre-arraignment review, (3) arraignment
hearing, and (4) preventive detention hearing.114
1. Book and Release
The law attempted to effectuate its purpose of safely releasing
as many defendants as possible in part by providing the opportunity
for most misdemeanants to be released within twelve hours of
booking.115 A person arrested or detained for a misdemeanor would
be released by the booking agency within twelve hours of booking,
unless any of the ten enumerated exceptions applied.116 If one of
these exceptions applied, then the law deemed the suspect ineligible
for immediate117 book and release and mandated that he or she be
held until pre-arraignment review.118 At this stage of detention, risk
assessments were not implemented. Instead, arrestees were
separated based upon set criteria—the ten exceptions. If an arrestee
was charged with a misdemeanor and one of the ten exceptions did
not apply, they would be released. If charged with a felony, the
arrestee was ineligible for immediate release and had to undergo
pre-arraignment review.
2. Pre-Arraignment Review
The next stage was pre-arraignment review, which applied
to any rollover misdemeanants from book and release who were
ineligible for immediate release, and to most people charged with
felonies.119 These two categories of people were to be assessed by
Pretrial Assessment Services (“PAS”) within twenty-four hours of
booking.120 As defined by the bill:

See id.
See id.
See id. The statute carves out the following exceptions from the automatic release
provisions: (1) Any offense found in Cal. Penal Code section 290; (2) the suspect is charged
with a domestic violence crime such as 273.4, 243(e)(1), and certain violations of domestic
violence restraining order like 273.5 or stalking; (3) the suspect is charged with their
third DUI at a BAC of .20 of higher; (4) the suspect has been arrested for a restraining
order violation within the last five years; (5) the suspect has three or more prior warrants
for “failure to appear” within the past 12 months; (6) the suspect is pending trial or
sentencing on a misdemeanor or a felony; (7) the suspect is on formal probation or postconviction supervision; (8) the suspect has intimidated, dissuaded, or threatened
retaliation against a witness or victim of the current crime; (9) the suspect has violated a
condition of pretrial release within the past five years; or (10) the person has a serious or
violent felony prior within the last five years. Id.
117 See S.B. 10, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on
August 28, 2018) (the term “immediate” in this context means within 12 hours).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
114
115
116

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/17/2021 12:41 PM

Risk Assessments are the Diagnosis not the Cure

589

“Pretrial Assessment Services” means an entity, division, or program
that is assigned the responsibility . . . to assess the risk level of
persons charged with the commission of a crime, report the results of
the risk determination to the court, and make recommendations for
conditions of release of individuals pending adjudication of their
criminal case, and as directed under statute or rule of court,
implement risk-based determinations regarding release and
detention.121

PAS would then use the suspect’s information to conduct a
risk assessment based on a validated tool122 which would assign
the suspect a score, and that would categorize them as low risk,
medium risk, or high risk based on that score.123 It is at this
stage of review that the risk assessment tool would be used
“diagnostically.” PAS would input the arrestee’s data into the
tool, and the algorithm will then “diagnose” the arrestee’s risk
and direct the next step.124
For suspects deemed “high risk,” their next step would be to
await arraignment, where a judge could review their detention
status because they could not, by law, be released by Pretrial
Services.125 For suspects whom the algorithm deemed low risk,126
their next step would be release on their own recognizance (“OR”)
by PAS.127 Finally, for suspects whom the algorithm deemed
“medium risk“,128 their next step was further review either by
Id.
S.B.10, 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August
28, 2018).
‘Validated risk assessment tool’ means a risk assessment instrument, selected
and approved by the court, in consultation with Pretrial Assessment Services
or another entity providing pretrial risk assessments, from the list of approved
pretrial risk assessment tools maintained by the Judicial Council. The
assessment tools shall be demonstrated by scientific research to be accurate
and reliable in assessing the risk of a person failing to appear in court as
required or the risk to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal
offense if the person is released before adjudication of his or her current
criminal offense and minimize bias.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See id.
126 Id.
‘Low risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the
use of a validated risk assessment tool, was categorized as having a minimal
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current
criminal offense.
127 This did not apply if the individual meets one of the ten exceptions discussed
above. Id.
128 Id.
‘Medium risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the
person’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services,
including the use of a validated risk assessment tool, was categorized as
121
122
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PAS or by the courts. If PAS conducted the review, it would
gather more information and then determine whether the
suspect be released on their own recognizance or, alternatively,
under supervised own recognizance (“SOR”).129 If the courts
conducted the pre-arraignment review,130 either a judge on-call or
a judicial officer would further analyze and determine whether
the suspect would be released OR or SOR, or else be detained
until arraignment.131
3. Arraignment Hearing
All suspects still in custody and not released through the
previous two stages were entitled to a release or detention
determination at arraignment.132 At this stage, victims were
notified and given an opportunity to be heard.133 The court had
the discretion to modify the conditions of release upon request by
either party.134 It is also at this stage that the District Attorney
was able to file a motion for preventive detention, which would
allow the court to detain the defendant pending a hearing.135
There were only certain enumerated circumstances, usually
involving heightened danger of the suspect, that allowed a
prosecutor to seek preventive detention.136 Once this motion was
having a moderate level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk
to public safety due to the commission of a new criminal offense while released
on the current criminal offense.
129 If reviewed by PAS, the suspect was required to be detained if they met one of the
ten criteria discussed in footnote 116, supra. If not, then the suspect had to be released
either on their own recognizance or supervised own recognizance, “with the least
restrictive nonmonetary condition or combination of conditions that [would] reasonably
assure public safety and the person’s return to court.” Id.
130 “Medium risk” suspects and those that fell within the 10 criteria had to be either
detained by PAS until arraignment or reviewed by the court, and the court had to use the
pretrial assessment services information and consider their options for release. Id.
131 For a medium risk defendant who is further reviewed by the court prior to
arraignment, a judge could decide to detain the defendant until arraignment only if there
is a substantial likelihood that no condition will reasonably assure public safety or the
defendant’s return to court. Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Note that the court cannot initiate a preventive detention hearing on its own
motion. See id.
136 (1) The crime for which the person was arrested was committed with violence
against a person, threatened violence, or the likelihood of serious bodily injury, or was one
in which the person was personally armed with or personally used a deadly weapon or
firearm in the commission of the crime, or was one in which he or she personally inflicted
great bodily injury in the commission of the crime.
(2) At the time of arrest, the defendant was on any form of postconviction supervision
other than informal probation or court supervision.
(3) At the time of arrest, the defendant was subject to a pending trial or sentencing on a
felony matter.
(4) The defendant intimidated or threatened retaliation against a witness or victim of the
current crime.
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filed, the court had to determine whether to release the
defendant or else detain him pending the preventive detention
hearing. If the court determined there was a “substantial
likelihood that no nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions of pretrial supervision” could reasonably assure either
the appearance of the defendant at the preventive detention
hearing or reasonably assure public safety prior to the preventive
detention hearing, the court could detain the defendant pending
this hearing, but it had to state its reasons for doing so on the
record.137
4. Preventive Detention Hearing
A suspect found to need preventive detention was either
violent or high-risk as defined by the statute.138 They were
entitled to a hearing within three days of arraignment.139 At this
stage, there was a rebuttable presumption that the defendant
needed to be detained.140 For the court to find it necessary for a
suspect to be preventively detained, the court had to make two
findings: (1) there was probable cause to believe the defendant
committed the charged crime where there was no indictment and
the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, and (2)
there was clear and convincing evidence that no condition or
combination of conditions could reasonably assure the protection
of the public or the appearance of the defendant in court.141 The
court had to then state the reasons for its determination on the
record.142 This assured that the court was recognizing and
working to protect both the suspect’s presumption of innocence
(by finding that there is probable cause) while also protecting the
community against danger and assuring the defendant’s return
to court.143

(5) There is substantial reason to believe that no nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure protection of the public or a
victim, or the appearance of the defendant in court as required. Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
‘High risk’ means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the
use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a significant
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current
criminal offense.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See id.
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A court could consider many of the same factors they would
consider under California Penal Code section 1275 when deciding
whether to release a suspect on bail:144 the nature and
circumstances of the crime charged as well as the risk to the
community posed by the defendant’s release, the weight of
evidence against the defendant, the defendant’s past conduct,
family and community ties, criminal history, and record for court
appearances.145 The court could also consider if the defendant
was on probation, parole, or some other type of supervised
release pending trial, sentencing or appeal. Additionally, the
court could look to the recommendation of Pretrial Assessment
Services obtained using a validated risk assessment
instrument.146 The court could then evaluate the “impact of
detention on the defendant’s family responsibilities and
community ties, employment, and participation in education.”147
In this way, SB 10 would have allowed considerations that have
never been statutorily recognized.148
SB 10 proposed that the Judicial Council should maintain a
list of validated risk assessments from which each county could
choose.149 It also proposed that these pretrial assessment services
be performed by either court employees or a third party qualified
local public agency.150
Although this bill may not perfect—as few pieces of
legislation ever are—it is evident that the Task Force
thoughtfully considered the multiple levels and layers to bail and
the consequences of reforming our current system. At best, SB 10
protects the presumption of innocence by generously limiting
pretrial detention, while combining algorithmic tools with
modified judicial discretion. At worst, SB 10 provides a solid
platform from which other states can build, as it clearly takes

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (2020).
Id.
S.B.10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August
28, 2018).
147 Id.
148 While California Penal Code section 1272.1 gives judges the ability to evaluate the
defendant’s ties to the community and his/her family “attachments,” the word
“responsibilities” is never mentioned in the statute. The word “responsibilities” indicates
to the judge that other people, not just the defendant, will be impacted by pretrial
detention. For example, it is possible that the defendant is the sole caregiver for young
children or elderly parents, and SB 10 would have allowed the judge to account for such
responsibilities when making his/her decision. Additionally, the present statutes do not
currently permit judges to consider participation in education when determining pretrial
release. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1272.1 (2020).
149 S.B.10, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (codified as law in Chapter 244 on August
28, 2018).
150 Id.
144
145
146
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into consideration the multitude of problems our current cash
bail system presents.
IV. THE MULTIPLE GOALS OF BAIL REFORM
Bail reform is a complex and arduous process in large part
because it does not have one singular goal.151 As an illustration,
consider a sports team that continually loses games. The team
would be foolish not to adapt its strategy in response to failure,
because ultimately, its goal is to win. Of course, achieving that
ultimate goal requires first achieving several smaller goals such
as greater teamwork, tightening up the team’s defense, and
better anticipating the other team’s plays. There is one ultimate
goal, and all sub-goals work toward it. The same cannot be said
about bail reform.
Not only does the fight to reform the bail system contain
multiple goals, but some of these goals clash with each other.
Accomplishing one goal may come at the expense of another.152
Bail reform seeks to accomplish a myriad of objectives, ranging
from “preserving the presumption of innocence for people charged
with crimes, imposing the least restrictive conditions on release,
protecting the public from people charged with crimes, ensuring
that people return to court, imposing detention in a racially and
economically fair way, and reducing America’s astounding
pretrial incarceration rate.”153 The presence of multiple,
competing goals naturally generates intense debate regarding
what bail reform ought to look like.
Given this division, it is unsurprising that politicians and
activists cannot reach a consensus.154 Danny Montes, the
Alliances Director for Californians for Safety and Justice tweeted
in support of SB 10, “Why Californians Need #BailReform ‘If
someone can afford their bail even though they are a threat to
public safety, they’re free to go.” Taking an opposing view, New
York Legal Aid’s Decarceration Project responded: “Sorry, you
have it backwards. Our bail system should prioritize release and
decarceration above all else.”155 This exchange is just one
example of how reform-minded, anticipated allies can spiral into
stalemate based upon which bail reform goals matter most to
them.
151 Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing,
supra note 12, at 1144.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See id.
155 Id.; see also DecarcerationProject (@DecarcerateNYC), TWITTER (Aug. 17, 2017, 2:07 PM),
https://twitter.com/DecarcerateNYC/status/898290148550389760 [http://perma.cc/A7YN-M3M5].
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V. RISK ASSESSMENT ADVOCATES
The arguments in favor of implementing risk assessments
for pretrial decisions are intuitive. One well-supported argument
for adopting risk assessments is that replacing human judgment
with algorithms produces more consistent results.156 To this
point, one author noted, “[F]ormal, actuarial, and algorithmic
methods of prediction perform better than the intuitive methods
used by judges or other experts.”157 By replacing human
discretion with formulaic algorithms, pretrial detention decisions
can be standardized and streamlined.158 The idea that actuarial
tools perform better than human intuition at predicting crime
comes from 1950s–1980s psychology research.159 A meta-analysis
of the literature in this area160 shows that algorithms are ten
percent more accurate than human clinical predictions.161
However, not all these advocates of risk assessments believe
they are a perfect tool. “Santa Barbara Probation Chief Tanja
Heitman, whose county has been experimenting with
alternatives to money bail, said she believes risk assessments
can actually help reduce racial disparities.”162 Although youth of
color are 2.6 times more likely to get arrested than their white
counterparts in Santa Barbara County, their release rates are
identical.163 Heitman has seen the risk assessment tool erase
certain racial biases in the juvenile criminal justice system in her
county.164 Notwithstanding the tool’s lack of perfection, risk
assessment advocates still support the tool’s ability to weed out
racial biases present within determination decisions.
The second argument in favor of risk assessments is that
pretrial detention decisions should be conditioned upon true risk,
not ability to pay. These advocates have a particular problem
with the cash aspect of the current bail system. Supporters of the
Detention decisions should be made based on true risk of flight
and likelihood of committing another crime while out on bail, not
on ability to pay an arbitrary sum of money.165 “Conversely,

See Stevenson, supra note 24, at 317–22.
Id. at 321.
See CHARLES SUMMERS & TIM WILLIS, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., RESEARCH SUMMARY: PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1 (2010).
159 Stevenson, supra note 24, at 322.
160 This meta-analysis consolidates the data from ten papers that compare algorithms
to human prediction. Id.
161 Id.; William M. Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A MetaAnalysis, 12 PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 19, 19 (2000).
162 Lagos, supra note 109.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Stevenson, supra note 24, at 317.
156
157
158
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wealthy defendants who pose a high risk of serious crime should
not be released simply because they can afford bail.”166 They
argue that “conditioning release on money results in racial and
wealth-based disparities in detention, a waste of taxpayer money,
and harm to public safety.”167
VI. RISK ASSESSMENT CRITICS
Unlike risk assessment advocates who find value in replacing
human judgement with a consistent algorithm, risk assessment
critics believe the algorithm is just as damning as the data it
utilizes and is skewed by discriminatory practices. Robin Steinberg,
The Bail Project’s Chief Executive Officer, argues that “these
algorithmic assessments are only as good as the data they use.”168
This data will inevitably reflect the “deeply imbedded racism and
economic inequity that has driven mass incarceration in the first
place.”169 While the risk assessment may seem to eliminate the evil
of cash bail, it simply repackages the type of inequity presented.
“Whereas defendants were condemned to pre-trial detention prior to
the bill’s passage due to their poverty and inability to make bail,
they will now be in pre-trial detention due to their risk
assessment—which will inevitably be based on their poverty, plus
their race.”170
A. Racism Entrenched in the American Criminal Justice
System
To understand the staunch opposition to risk assessments, it is
necessary to understand just how engrained with racism the
American criminal justice system is, dating back to the 1800s. From
Jim Crow laws which “codified discrimination and second-class
status for African Americans”171 to the fight for African American
suffrage,172 “[r]acial disparities in the criminal justice system have
deep roots in American history and penal policy.”173 The War on
Drugs illustrates a law or policy that appears neutral on its face but
systemically disenfranchised people of color in its effect. Under the
administration of President Nixon and subsequently of President
Id. at 318.
Id. at 317–18.
Arvind Dilawar, What Should Replace Cash Bail?, PAC. STANDARD (Apr. 9, 2019)
https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-should-replace-cash-bail [http://perma.cc/CZL5-XNFV].
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and AntiImmigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 166 (2010).
172 Sarah Pruitt, When Did African Americans Actually Get the Right to Vote?, HIST.
(Jan.
29,
2020), https://www.history.com/news/african-american-voting-right-15thamendment [http://perma.cc/E9YL-2JUT].
173 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2.
166
167
168
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Reagan, the War on Drugs was declared an effort to eradicate
“public enemy number one”: drugs.174 Notwithstanding the genuine
objectives underlying the War on Drugs, the delivery and
enforcement of these laws proved disproportionately detrimental to
people of color because of drug-free zone laws.175 Residential
segregation had pushed low-income African Americans to high
density areas of the city, which often included schools, playgrounds,
and public housing projects.176 The influx of low-income African
Americans caused the exodus of white people from those areas and
into the less densely populated suburbs.177 Drug-free zone laws
prohibited the use or sale of drugs in proximity to certain “zones”
which were protected areas such as schools, playgrounds, and
public housing projects.178 This necessarily meant that the majority
of people affected by these laws were African-Americans since they
were the ones living in those zones.
The punishment for using or selling drugs in one of these zones
could earn someone a punitive sentence, including mandatory
minimums and sentencing enhancements.179 In certain states,

defendants convicted of drug-free zone offenses faced a fixed
mandatory minimum penalty enhancement, which was added
to any sentence imposed upon them for the underlying drug
offense.180 While in other states, defendants faced
enhancements to their presumptive sentencing guidelines
range.181 Yet, in some states, convictions of offenses within
drug-free zones raised the felony class of the underlying
offense which exposed the defendant to a more severe
penalty.182 Lastly, drug-free zone offenses elevated youth from
being prosecuted as juveniles to being prosecuted as adults.183
The War on Drugs is just one example of a law that is
neutral on its face but racist in its impact. Our history is laden
with laws that are facially neutral, like the Bail Reform Act
evaluated in United States v. Salerno, but racially discriminatory

174 War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/thewar-on-drugs [http://perma.cc/VST8-SWCG]; Chris Barber, Public Enemy Number One: A
Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug Problem, RICHARD NIXON FOUND. (June 29, 2016),
https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404/ [http://perma.cc/E3YG-LX36].
175 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 3.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Punishments for offenses within the drug-free zones were double the punishment
for the same offenses committed outside these zones. JUDITH GREENE, KEVIN PRANIS, &
JASON ZIEDENBERG, DISPARITY BY DESIGN: HOW DRUG-FREE ZONE LAWS IMPACT RACIAL
DISPARITY—AND FAIL TO PROTECT YOUTH 5 (Just. Pol’y Inst. eds., 2006).
180 Id. at 7.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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in effect.184 Cash bail and the myriad of pretrial detention laws
that come with it are no exception.
Such laws have scarred our criminal justice system. People
of color, particularly African Americans, are disproportionately
overrepresented in the criminal justice system.185 “Black people
are incarcerated in state prisons at a rate 5.1 times greater than
that of white people.”186 For African American men, the
incarceration rate is more than 3,000 per 100,000 citizens.187 This
is approximately four times the national average and
approximately six times the rate among white men.188 Where an
African American male has a thirty-two percent chance of
serving time in prison at some point in his life, a white male born
at the same time would only have a six percent chance of being
sent to prison.189 The same rings true for African American
women. Forty-four percent of incarcerated women are black even
though only about thirteen percent of the female population is
black.190
“[T]hese racial disparities are no accident, but rather are
rooted in a history of oppression and discriminatory decision
making that have deliberately targeted black people and helped
create an inaccurate picture of crime that deceptively links them
with criminality.”191 While some argue that these disparate
numbers are a result of disparate crime rate because men and
women of color simply commit more crimes than White men and
women, 192 such claims have no factual or statistical basis.

184 See S. 1070, 49 Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (allowing officers who possess
“reasonable suspicion” that an individual is unlawfully present in the United States to
make reasonable attempts to determine the immigration status of that person under the
Support our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act); see also McClesky v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 286–87, 320 (1987) (explaining a study that showed the death penalty was
more often imposed in Georgia on black defendants and killers of white victims than on
white defendants and killers of black victims); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100,
126–28 (1981) (showing that the road closure had a racially discriminatory effect because
the only drivers who were inconvenienced by the action were black); Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227 (1985) (finding that section 182 of the Alabama
Constitution, which provided for the disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude, violated equal protection because even though it was racially
neutral on its face, the original enactment was motivated by a desire to discriminate
against blacks on account of race, and the provision had a racially discriminatory impact
since its adoption).
185 See John Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 377,
378 (2013).
186 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2.
187 Conyers, supra note 185, at 378.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Hinton et al., supra note 72, at 2.
191 Id.
192 Conyers, supra note 185, at 378.
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Despite society’s recent progress on social justice issues,
racism remains entrenched in our criminal justice system. Just
last year, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office began a
process of “blind charging.”193 The office removed all demographic
and racial information from incident reports before they reached
the hands of prosecutors in an effort to correct the overcharging
of African Americans and the undercharging of similarly situated
white people.194 This was the office’s effort to “directly confront
[] ingrained racial bias” that leads some prosecutors to charge
African Americans for low-level drug offenses more frequently
than their similarly situated white counterparts, “even though
studies show that white people use illicit drugs at higher
rates.”195
B. The Unintended Racist Consequences of Risk Assessments
If, as critics argue, algorithms are entrenched with racially
biased data, then the assessments they produce will inevitably be
discriminatory as well. Can an egg be separated from a cake that
has already been baked? Of course not. This is exactly how critics of
the pre-trial risk assessments view the efficacy of these tools—these
algorithms “bake in” longstanding practices of bias that cannot be
extracted.196 Matt Watkins, senior writer for the Center for Court
Innovation, explains “[t]here’s no way to square the circle there,
taking the bias out of the system by using data generated by a
system shot through with racial bias” is simply impossible.197
Critics explain the push for risk assessments as “entrenching
racial disparities and hiding them behind the rhetoric of
science”198 If the data used in the risk assessment algorithms is
heavily engrained with systemic and institutional racism, then
the output of that algorithm is not going to be a neutral
evaluation or an accurate representation of the person’s risk.199
193 Timothy Williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate Than Whites. What
if Prosecutors Didn’t Know Their Race?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html
[http://perma.cc/WE2K-GNVU].
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Thompkins, supra note 25.
197 Beth Schwartzapfel, Can Racist Algorithms be Fixed?, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 1,
2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/07/01/can-racist-algorithms-befixed [http://perma.cc/LU53-VVA5].
198 Robin Steinberg, Cash Bail Must be Eliminated, but ‘Risk Assessments’ Aren’t the
Tool
to
do
it,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
1,
2018,
12:26
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/2018/08/30/california-law-riskassessments-bail-justice-system-policing-usa/1043956002/ [http://perma.cc/3GM2-RECF].
199 See generally CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, WHAT DOES FAIRNESS LOOK
LIKE? CONVERSATIONS ON RACE, RISK ASSESSMENT TOOLS, AND PRETRIAL JUSTICE (2018)
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/Final%20Report--ACLU-
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This issue was examined by ProPublica, a non-profit news group
whose mission is to “expose abuses of power and betrayals of the
public trust by government, business, and other institutions,
using the moral force of investigative journalism.”200 In May of
2016, ProPublica published a study called Machine Bias, which
criticized risk assessments for their inability to accurately
predict future risk for defendants detained pre-trial.201
Specifically, this inaccuracy is skewed toward black defendants.
ProPublica found the COMPAS risk assessment tool202 produced
great error in misclassifying black defendants as high risk when
it did not similarly misclassify white defendants.203
Bernard Parker, an African American man, and Dylan Fugett,
a White man, both arrested on drug charges, received massively
different risk assessment scores. Dylan was rated as a three (low
risk) and Bernard was rated as a ten (high risk).204 Looking at these
numbers, one would not know that Fugett had a prior attempted
burglary conviction whereas Parker only had a non-violent resisting
arrest conviction.205 After release, Fugett re-offended three times
with possession of drugs while Bernard did not reoffend even
once.206 This further confirmed the notion that White people do not
commit less crimes than their African American counterparts, and
drugs are not a “black problem.”207
The following example will, to a certain extent, explain why
these misclassifications occur.208 If racial group A is arrested at a
higher rate than racial group B, then a tool that uses arrest rate
as a factor for future re-arrest will undoubtedly find anyone in

NYU%20CRIL%20Convening%20on%20Race%20Risk%20Assessment%20%20Fairness.pd
f [http://perma.cc/7BKF-73W5].
200 About Us, PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/about/ [http://perma.cc/W9YCRRBP] (last visited May 10, 2020).
201 Julia
Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
http://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[http://perma.cc/33BE-NK3W].
202 COMPAS, which stands for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for
Alternative Sanctions, is a risk and needs assessment instrument that was first developed
in 1998 and has evolved several times to reach its most current model—the fourth
generation. NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1 (2019)
http://www.equivant.com/wp-content/uploads/Practitioners-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core040419.pdf [http://perma.cc/TD6K-WGP9].
203 See Angwin et al., supra note 201; SARAH PICARD ET AL., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION,
BEYOND THE ALGORITHM 4 (2019) http://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/beyondalgorithm [http://perma.cc/FD5U-TSM6].
204 Angwin et al., supra note 201.
205 Id.
206 See id.
207 Id.
208 This example is not used to undermine the importance of individuality in risk
assessments. It is used solely to show how the data plugged into risk assessments can be
biased from the get-go.
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group A as higher risk.209 Group A represents African Americans
and group B represents Caucasians. Caucasians escape high risk
determinations because the criminal justice system does not
target them like it targets African Americans. Certain
communities, specifically communities of color, have greater
contact with the criminal justice system simply because of the
heightened policing that occurs in those communities.210 The
statistics that result from those interactions do not indicate the
dangerousness of people of color; if anything, they indicate just
how targeted police behavior can be.211 Consequently, although
risk assessments themselves are not biased tools since they are
merely math equations, these equations are applied to infected
data. Just as what goes up must come down, what goes in must
come out. If racially biased data goes in, racially biased results
must come out.
VII. A LOOK TO THE FUTURE: A 3-IN-1 SOLUTION
One might argue that risk assessments should be removed
entirely from the bail reform discussion, given their potential to
over-detain and to make false predictions. Risk assessments may
exacerbate rather than alleviate the issues inherent in the cash
bail system.212 But eliminating them from the picture is not the
proper solution. These algorithms can be used as a force to even
the playing field and not as a math equation that
disproportionately hurts defendants of color, provided they are
not used in a vacuum.213 Risk assessments are exactly what their
name suggests: tools. They are not a magical device that will
single-handedly solve our country’s discriminatory pre-trial
detention system. While these tools have the potential to further
racism and inequality, if used correctly, they could alleviate these
problems. Consequently, the question is–how do we use them
correctly?
The following solution is three-fold. First, these tools must be
used diagnostically. Second, there must be a system of pretrial
services dedicated solely to implementing these risk assessments
and offering pretrial services that will stand in place of
detention. Third, judges must undergo training that works to
undo the implicit bias that often permeates pretrial decisions.

209
210
211
212
213

CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, supra note 199, at 12.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Steinberg, supra note 198.
CTR. ON RACE, INEQ., + THE L. & ACLU, supra note 189, at 12.

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/17/2021 12:41 PM

Risk Assessments are the Diagnosis not the Cure

601

A. Solution 1: Using Risk Assessments Diagnostically
Risk assessments are simply algorithms, but as discussed
above, they can produce impartial results. To use this double-edged
sword for good, risk assessments must be used only as diagnostic
tools to direct either release, further review, or holding until
arraignment. Risk assessments should not be used as the sole
determining factor for pretrial detention. Using the tool
diagnostically means the algorithm is used to diagnose and direct
the defendant’s next step in the pretrial detention decision process,
rather than conclusively determine their confinement. Because the
data used in these algorithms is not always probative of a
defendant’s flight risk or danger to the community, courts should
not rely solely on these algorithms to make their pretrial decision or
use them as a replacement for judicial discretion.214 Using risk
assessments conclusively without regard for human discretion or
without implementing various layers of review will inevitably lead
to skewed results and could very well further entrench the process
in discriminatory results.
The Center for Court Innovation conducted an analysis that
explained what happens when risk assessment tools are used
diagnostically and what happens when they are used
conclusively.215 The Center for Court Innovation’s study used real
data from a sample of New York City defendants from 2015.216
They tested the data through three models and found that the
hybrid model, which used the risk assessment diagnostically—as
explained above—yet still gave judges discretion, produced the
most racially equivalent results.217
The study focused on assessing what types of errors the risk
assessment tool makes.218 After interpreting the findings, the
Center for Court Innovation concluded not that we should
eliminate risk assessments, but that we should restrict pretrial
detention only to defendants charged with violent crimes and
scored as high-risk.219 This method actually reduces overall
incarceration and also alleviates racial disparities. Jurisdictions
need not be confined to their risk assessment tools, but rather
should utilize them as powerful tools for bail reform; hence,
Beyond the Algorithm.220
Steinberg supra note 188.
PICARD et al., supra note 203, at 3.
The data used in this study was not actually used to inform pretrial decisions; it
was simply used for research purposes. See id. at 5.
217 Id. at 12–13.
218 Id. at 3–4.
219 Id. at 12.
220 Id. at 13–14.
214
215
216
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The Center for Court Innovation’s findings demonstrate why
it is important to look beyond the math equation within risk
assessments and use them to diagnose, not determine. This study
involved an empirical test of racial bias in risk assessment tools
and evaluated “whether there are policy-level solutions that
could conserve the benefits of risk assessment, while also
addressing valid concerns over racial fairness.”221 The study
evaluated a risk assessment tool that employs an algorithm that
combines a defendant’s prior convictions, jail or prison sentences,
FTAs,222 probation status, charge type, charge severity,
concurrent open cases, as well as age and gender to generate a
risk score.223 These categories are weighted and combined to
generate a numerical score which then translates into one of five
risk categories: minimal, low, moderate, moderate-high, and
high-risk categories.224
This study collected a sample of all arrests made in New York
City in 2015.225 This included more than 175,000 defendants: 49%
Black, 36% Hispanic, and 14% white.226 While the tool does not
explicitly include race as a category because of the constitutional
problems that would present, the study is conscious of the fact that
race is embedded into each one of these categories.227 Additionally,
while it may seem strange that gender is included as a category, its
inclusion “mitigates the tendency of the tool to over-classify female
defendants as high-risk.”228
Ultimately, the study showed that the tool was accurate in its
predictions of re-arrest regardless of race or ethnicity. Defendants
classified as high-risk were rearrested at rates of 72% for Blacks,
71% for Hispanics, and 70% for Whites.229 Similarly, defendants
categorized at “minimal risk” were only re-arrested at rates of
11%, 9%, and 10% respectively for those three groups.230 However,
there were substantial racial differences in re-arrest in the low
and moderate risk categories.231 The data was then placed into
three different models of decision-making and the results were
calculated and analyzed.232

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232

Id. at 3.
FTA stands for failure to appear. See id. at 15.
See id.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 5
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 10.
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1. Scenario 1: Business as Usual
The first scenario “Business as Usual” involves a system
where judges maintain their subjective judicial discretion, and
risk assessments are merely present as suggestions, no matter
what risk category the defendant is placed in.233 In this scenario,
real-world differences that exist in pre-trial detention based on
the person’s race persisted.234 For example, in New York in 2015,
defendants who were held in detention were 31% Black, 25%
Hispanic, and 22% White.235 A total of 27% of defendants were
detained.236 False positives, representing the individuals who
were classified as high-risk but were not in fact re-arrested on a
new charge, were found to be rather high. They averaged at 19%,
with the rate for Blacks 6% higher than the rate for Whites.237
2. Scenario 2: Risk-Based Approach with an Adjusted
High-Risk Threshold
In the second scenario, “Risk-Based Approach with an
Adjusted High-Risk Threshold,” pretrial detention is based solely
on the risk-assessment tool and not on judicial discretion.238 Only
defendants in the highest risk category would be detained,
thereby reducing the proportion of defendants who would be
exposed to pretrial detention.239 In this scenario, overall
detention decreased by 9% for a total detention rate of 18%.240
Additionally, the false positive rate decreased to 8%.241 However,
even though false positives decreased overall, there still existed a
disparity of 7% in the false positives between Black defendants
and White defendants.242
3. Scenario 3: Hybrid Charge and Risk Based Approach
In the final scenario, “Hybrid Charge and Risk Based
Approach,” pretrial detention was reserved exclusively for
defendants who fell into the highest two risk categories and were
charged with a violent felony or domestic violence.243 This
assumes that “most misdemeanor and non-violent defendants are
not appropriate candidates for bail or detention consideration,
See id.
See id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
False positives for black defendants was 21%, 17% for Hispanic defendants, and
15% for white defendants. Id. at 11, 13.
238 See id. at 11.
239 See id.
240 Id. at 11–12.
241 Id. 13.
242 Id. at 11–13.
243 Id. at 11. Also, note the similarity of this approach to the one suggested by SB 10.
233
234
235
236
237
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regardless of risk level.”244 Controversially so, this hybrid
approach recognized that “charge alone is not a good proxy for
risk, and that some individuals with violent charges can be safely
supervised in the community.”245
For example, in 1999, Tom May, a 75-year old man, faced a
murder charge for the “mercy killing” of his terminally ill wife.246
May and his wife shared 50 years of a loving, happy marriage,
but May’s wife begged to be put out of her misery once her
condition began to deteriorate due to Lou Gehrig’s disease.247 One
day, May gave his wife an overdose of her medication and then
carried her into the car in the garage and started the engine.248
He sat beside his dying wife for hours hoping to also die with her,
but he lived.249 He was arrested and freed on $100,000 bail.250
The seventy-six-year-old retired Navy officer later committed
suicide.251 May’s situation is a prime example of a defendant
facing a serious charge that presents virtually no risk to the
community whatsoever.252 This is why the individual’s
circumstances, rather than just their ability to post bond based
on their charge, matter.
This hybrid approach suggests a reduction in overall pretrial
detention rates by 51% when compared to the other two
scenarios.253 In contrast to the 27% overall detention rate
presented by the “business as usual” model, only 13% would be
detained under this “hybrid” model.254 Additionally, this model
greatly alleviates racial prejudice in false positives: 16% for
Blacks and Hispanics alike, and 14% for Whites.255 While the
overall false positive rate is not as low as the “risk-based
approach” model, the disproportionate detention by race is
greatly decreased, and that is of utmost importance.

Id.
Id.
See Tony Perry, Man, 75, May Face Charges in Mercy Killing of Wife, L.A. TIMES
(Oct.
13,
1999),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-oct-13-mn-21770story.html [http://perma.cc/G58K-ETGX].
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Tony Perry, Man Facing ‘Mercy Killing’ Trial Commits Suicide, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
29,
2000),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-feb-29-mn-3718-story.html
[http://perma.cc/8RBP-K9VV].
251 Id.
252 See id.
253 PICARD et al., supra note 203, at 12.
254 Id
255 Id. at 13.
244
245
246
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Not only does this show that operating on a “business as
usual” basis will continue to perpetuate racial inequalities
present within the bail system, but it also proves that risk
assessments can be used to even the playing field when used
diagnostically.258 It is true that risk assessments used in isolation
and without proper understanding of how destructive they can be
can actually perpetuate these racial biases, especially in
“jurisdictions where [B]lack, Hispanic, or other racial or ethnic
groups have disproportionate contact with the justice system.”259
However, this study substantiates that the argument ‘risk
assessments perpetuate racial inequalities, and thus should be
abandoned’ cannot actually withstand the statistics that prove
the power of risk assessments when used correctly.
“For more than two centuries, the key decisions in the legal
process, from pretrial release to sentencing to parole, have been
in the hands of human beings guided by their instincts and
personal biases.”260 The Center for Court Innovation said it best:
“Too often the debate over risk assessments portrays them as either a
technological panacea, or as evidence of the false promise of machine
learning. The reality is they are neither. Risk assessments are tools
with the potential to improve pretrial decision-making and enhance
fairness. To realize this potential, the onus is on practitioners to
consider a deliberate and modest approach to risk assessment,
vigilantly gauging the technology’s effects on both racial fairness and
incarceration along the way.”261

Diagnostic risk assessments do just that. This approach realizes
that risk assessments can be a helpful tool when used modestly. They
aim to release suspects early and often as long as it is safe for the
community, and as long as pretrial services can assure the suspect
will return to court. Gone are the days of pre-arraignment situations
where defendants must frantically call their family members to help
them post bond. Using the risk assessments diagnostically protects a
defendant’s presumption of innocence if they are unlikely to harm
others or evade court proceedings.

258
259
260
261

Id.
Id.
Angwin, supra note 201.
PICARD et al., supra note 203, at 14.
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B. Solution 2: Form Pretrial Services as an Independent Branch
1. Pretrial Services Should Not Be Under the Probation
Department
For the risk assessment tool to perform properly as a
diagnostic, there must be a system of pretrial services in place.
Ideally, these services would be provided by a stand-alone agency
under the auspices of the court, separate from probation. Probation
officers are not the best equipped to uphold one of the most
significant pillars of our criminal justice system: innocent until
proven guilty. Although probation was originally created with the
intent to rehabilitate offenders, over the years, probation officers
have increasingly taken on the tasks of law enforcement.262
Probation officers deal with defendants who have already been
convicted of a crime and now must be monitored in lieu of serving
time in prison.263 A probation officer’s primary role is to “ensure
that the offender does not engage in illegal or prohibited
behavior.”264 While true that probation officers also help defendants
find employment, stay out of trouble, and re-integrate into society, a
probation officer’s relationship with their client exists because their
client committed a crime; their presumption of innocence has
already been rebutted. It would be a disservice to defendants to task
probation officers with unlearning all their probationary skills to
administer risk assessments and pretrial services to defendants at
an entirely different stage in the criminal justice process.265 This
would require a huge mental jump on the part of the probation
officer and could lessen the efficacy and purpose of pretrial services.
The same is true with peace officers. Peace officers are
trained to detect crime.266 When a person gets arrested, is
booked, and then seen by pretrial services, a peace officer will
likely not presume innocence by default. Because of these
reasons, it is of utmost importance that pretrial services are an

262 Marcus Purkiss et al., Probation Officer Functions - A Statutory Analysis, 67 FED.
PROBATION 12, 12 (2003).
263 See Probation and Pretrial Officers and Officer Assistants, U.S. CTS.,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/probation-and-pretrial-services/probation-andpretrial-officers-and-officer [http://perma.cc/T6CU-W75M] (last visited Jan. 3, 2021).
264 Probation
Officer
Career,
PROBATION
OFFICER
EDU,
https://www.probationofficeredu.org/probation-officer/ [http://perma.cc/R5E3-6N7H] (last
visited Jan. 9, 2021).
265 See COLLIN DOYLE, CHIRAAG BRAINS & BROOK HOPKINS, BAIL REFORM: A GUIDE
FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS 25 (2019).
266 See Peace Officer Basic Training, POST COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS
AND TRAINING, https://post.ca.gov/peace-officer-basic-training [http://perma.cc/6GXTXAGW] (last visited May 20, 2020).
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independent agency under the auspices of the court, not the
probation department.
2. What Services Should a Pretrial Service Agency Offer?
It is vital for a pretrial service agent to have a background in
social work. The goal of using risk assessment diagnostically as
an enhancement, not a replacement, for judicial discretion is to
put the “human” back into the process. Therefore, understanding
the complexities of a person’s life is crucial.
Additionally, it is important for pretrial services to operate
independently, so it has the capacity not only to perform risk
assessments, but to supervise defendants upon release.
Additionally, the agency can offer mental health services run by
professionals trained specifically in criminality, and it can
oversee defendants released on Supervised Own Recognizance in
a way that encourages the defendant to return to court. Further,
the agency can offer phone call or text message reminders for
low-level offenders, transportation services, and counseling.
Following through with defendants is inevitably more work
than handing them a paper stating their next hearing date and
ordering them to appear in court. Probation and police agencies
are already bombarded with other tasks and will not have the
ability to carry out pretrial services to their full potential as a
designated, stand-alone Pretrial Service Agency would. As such,
the task must be entrusted to an agency equipped to handle it.
C. Solution 3: Educate Judges
1. Recognition of Bias
Because risk assessments are only to be used diagnostically,
judges will still retain their discretion if they find the defendant
high-risk, or in some situations, medium-risk. Most, if not all
judges will openly agree that racism is wrong. However, race may
unintentionally factor into a judge’s decision. The concept that all
individuals hold certain stereotypes and attitudes without
conscious awareness is called implicit bias.267 Even judges who
have taken an oath to be impartial protectors of the law struggle
with implicit bias.268
In a study performed on bail-setting in Connecticut,
researchers found that judges set bail for African American
267 See Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Race, Ethnicity, and Place Identity:
Implicit Bias and Competing Belief Systems, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 313, 314 (2015).
268 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1223 (2009).
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suspects at an amount 25% higher than similarly situated white
defendants.269 Killers of whites are more likely to receive longer
sentences than killers of blacks.270 Federal judges impose
sentences 12% longer on black defendants than on similarly
situated white defendants.271 Judges cannot dismiss that implicit
racial bias infects the entire criminal justice system. Even if
judges do not actively make racially charged decisions, their
subconscious biases still contribute to these racial disparities.
Consequently, the question is not “if a judge holds implicit bias,”
but “how do we unfold and unravel these biases.” The first step in
undoing bias is simply recognizing that it exists.
The good news is that the effects of these implicit biases can
be remedied by making judges aware of their existence and
prevalence.272 In a study where judges sensed their implicit bias
was being tested, white judges consciously attempted to
manipulate their determinations to cognitively correct any
appearance of bias.273 This study shows that merely identifying
the existence of implicit bias can have a positive impact, through
self-correction.
2. Implicit Bias Trainings
Although it is proven that racial prejudice permeates judicial
decisions, training must focus more on helping judges correct
their bias rather than their racism. Judges want to protect their
reputation and defend their morals. A judge who is supposed to
act as a neutral magistrate does not want to admit they hold
racist beliefs. Although implicit biases often manifest in racially
biased actions, a judge will be more likely to participate in
trainings that address bias than racism—a more politically
charged concept. Simply calling these trainings “implicit bias
trainings” might encourage judges to genuinely participate and
learn, rather than make them defensive and unwilling to attend.
3. Tentative Rulings on the Record
Aside from acknowledging bias and dealing with it through
training, further concrete actions must be taken when a person’s
liberty is on the line before they have been adjudged guilty. If a
suspect is not released prior to arraignment, or is held for a
preventive detention hearing, the judge should first be required
to make a tentative determination about release or detention on
269
270
271
272
273

Id. at 1196.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1203.
See id. at 1223.
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the record before the suspect ever steps into the courtroom.
Judges will base this tentative ruling on the risk assessment,
recommendation from Pretrial Services, and all case facts that
exist at the time and presented to them.
When a judge faces a defendant, his or her appearance,
including their race, automatically signals to the judge their
perceived likelihood of committing crime and their risk to the
community. To illustrate, judges tend to view black men as
“aggressive, criminal, dangerous, irresponsible, and intimately
connected to drug use and trade.”274 Drug use and distribution
are portrayed as “ghetto pathologies” that have invaded “White
space[s],” instead of being an issue that both Black people and
White people deal with.275 This makes it imperative for judges to
be given all the case facts, incident reports, and any other
necessary documents, with the defendant’s name and racial
identification removed, and be asked to make a determination
from the facts they have received from Pretrial Services without
ever laying eyes on the defendant.276 Based on the information on
paper, they must make a tentative ruling. Once the defendant is
brought into the courtroom, and if the judge decides to change
their tentative ruling, they must then state their reasoning on
the record.
This process does three things. First, it strips the suspect’s
file of any explicit pieces of information that indicate their
race.277 This eliminates the possibility of race being used as a
factor for the judge to use when making his or her decision.278 In
the absence of this information first presented on paper, the pure
fact that the defendant is standing before the judge presupposes
their criminality in a way that is more readily apparent, and
thus, makes the judge more likely to err on the side of
detention.279 Second, this method forces the judge to indicate real
reasons apart from an amorphous and abstract sense of “danger”

274 Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal Processing, 22
JUST. Q. 170, 172 (2005).
275 Id.
276 As previously mentioned, this is why it is imperative for the solution to be a mesh
of three solutions combined, the second one being a solid system of pretrial services.
Ideally, pretrial services would be so well equipped that judges should not need to deviate
from pretrial recommendations except in special circumstances. In New York City, once
risk assessments were implemented, judges became more likely to follow pretrial
recommendations and “when they did, subsequent court appearance rates improved
significantly.” N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, 1 (2016).
277 Of course, this statement is made with the understanding that certain pieces of
data can be racially entrenched even if they do not facially indicate this discrimination.
See Schlesinger, supra note 274, at 171–72.
278 See id. at 172.
279 See id.
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that emanates from the defendant’s physical appearance.280 It
forces them to look at the situation objectively. Third, this
tentative ruling will make judges more aware of the effects their
racially biased decisions can have. If a judge is unable to state a
legitimate reason on the record for changing his or her ruling, the
judge risks being overturned on appeal. Fourth, it will help
judges further recognize his or her implicit bias. What many
judges tend to do now is overestimate risk and overincarcerate
pre-trial.281 If a defendant appears to be a good candidate for
release on paper, but the judge feels the urge to detain them once
the defendant steps into the courtroom, this is certainly telling of
implicit bias. A tentative ruling on the record will require judges
to introspectively examine their decisions.
4. Diversity on the Bench
Finally, to use risk assessments to enhance judicial
discretion, there must be more diversity on the bench—diversity
of gender, race, color, and thought. In the entirety of American
history, only two of 113 Supreme Court Justices have been
African-American men.282 In the entirety of American history,
only five of the 114 Supreme Court Justices have been women.283
Neither have ever been appointed Chief Justice.284 However,
throughout American history, 107 of the 114 Supreme Court
Justices have been White males.285 Thus, when our country
portrays judicial authority, women and minorities are not in that
picture, and are simply referred to as the “other.”286 If one of the
See id.
Ted Gest, Are Pretrial Risk Assessments Biased? The Debate Sharpens, CRIME
REPORT
(Feb.
18,
2020),
http://thecrimereport.org/2020/02/18/are-pretrial-riskassessments-biased-the-debate-sharpens/ [http://perma.cc/CU8G-ZQRY].
282 The two men of color to serve on our Supreme Court are Thurgood Marshall
(1967–1991) and Clarence Thomas (1991-present). See Jessica Campisi & Brandon
Griggs, Of the 113 Supreme Court Justices in US History, All But 6 Have Been White Men,
CNN POLITICS (Sept. 5, 2018), http://www.cnn.com/2018/07/09/politics/supreme-courtjustice-minorities-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/UV67-82BB].
283 The five female Supreme Court Justices: Sandra Day O’Connor (1981–2005), Ruth
Bader Ginsburg (1993–2020), Sonia Sotomayor (2009–present), Elena Kagan (2010–
present), and Amy Coney Barrett (2020–present). See Women’s Underrepresentation in the
Judiciary,
REPRESENT
WOMEN
(Nov.
21,
2017),
http://www.representwomen.org/women_s_underrepresentation_in_the_judiciary
[http://perma.cc/W3LF-CXMS]; Senate Confirms Amy Coney Barrett for Supreme Court,
LAW & JUSTICE (Oct. 26, 2020), http://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/senate-confirms-amyconey-barrett-supreme-court/ [http://perma.cc/9QJ-H5EF]. Note that this Article was
written prior to Barrett’s confirmation.
284 Meet the Four Women Who Preceded Amy Coney Barrett on the Supreme Court,
USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/life/women-of-thecentury/2020/10/26/four-women-preceded-amy-coney-barrett-us-supreme-court-soniasotomayor-ruth-bader-ginsburg/3710518001/ [http://perma.cc/7R98-4HEB].
285 See id.; Campisi, supra note 282.
286 See Kathleen Mahoney, Judicial Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 2015 J. DISP.
280
281
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goals of bail reform is to put the human component back into the
process, then it is vital to fill the bench with individuals who
span various walks of life. At the end of the day, judges carry
their life experiences, thought processes, and identities into the
courtroom—which inevitably spill over into pretrial decisions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
“You are where you came from. There are no disembodied
selves. There are only humans embedded in practices, places, and
cultures.”287
It seems our cash bail system has lost sight of the fact that
the humans filtered through the criminal justice system come
from communities that raised them, families waiting at home for
their return, and jobs that cannot wait until they are released.
Our cash bail system assumes that a blanket monetary amount
based on the crime charged is the fairest way to determine
pretrial release. It fails to realize that these “practices, places,
and cultures,” have contributed to the factors a judge weighs
when determining risk. Because our cash bail system neglects
this, we must ensure that any system we implement as part of
bail reform does not. We cannot employ risk assessments at face
value and neglect judicial discretion that allows for a holistic
view of the facts. We must use these tools diagnostically to
release as many as is safely possible. To prevent risk
assessments from reducing the complexities of the human
experience to group data, we must perfect the human element
involved in the process.288
Our current system does not presume a defendant innocent.
It presumes them indigent, whether because of their race or
not.289 If bail reform has any true hope of eradicating these racial
inequalities, we must use risk assessments to guarantee that
liberty is the norm for all, that pretrial detention is the carefully
limited exception for all, and that the presumption of innocence
is fiercely protected for all.

RESOL. 43, 64 (2015).
287 Godsil, supra note 267, at 313.
288 See Steinberg, supra note 198.
289 David J. Reimel III, Algorithms & Instruments: The Effective Elimination of New
Jersey’s Cash Bail System and Its Replacement, 124 PENN ST. L. REV. 193, 216 (2019).

